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I. INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this article is to analyze the penal code of the Islamic Republic of 
Iran and to examine the methods by which the administration of justice is exercised in 
post-revolutionary Iran. 
The Iranian Revolution of 1978-79 was the culmination of a long struggle between 
the modern secularist trends that had engulfed Muslim societies for many decades and 
Islamic revivalist movements. The latter had contended that in order to save Muslim 
societies from internal decay, socio-political degeneration and Western domination, one 
would have to eschew Western secularist values and return to those of the early period 
of Islam. Perhaps no single manifestation of Western secularism in Muslim societies has 
been as disturbing to the revivalists as those reflected in the modern legal systems of 
Muslim countries. A return to shari'a, or Islamic law, has become the battle cry of Muslim 
revivalists from Tunisia to Egypt, and from the Levant to the Persian Gulf. In fact, a 
regime's adherence to the shari'a has become the litmus test of its Islamic solidarity and 
commitment to Islamic values. l 
For Ayatollah Khomeini and the Islamic militants who participated in the overthrow 
of the Pahlavi monarchy in Iran, the monarchical justice system was the primary channel 
for spreading corrupt,ion, inefficiency, and foreign political and cultural domination of 
the country. Offering a simple alternative to the notoriously slow and ineffective method 
of conflict adjudication during the Shah's reign, Khomeini stated: 
... the method established by Islam for enforcing people's rights, adjudi-
cating disputes, and executing judgments is at once simple, practical, and 
swift. When the juridical methods of Islam were applied, the shari'a judge in 
each town, assisted only by two bailiffs and with only a pen and an ink pot at 
* Associate Professor of Political Science, Spring Hill College, Mobile, Alabama. 
I See Mayer, Islamic Law, in ISLAM 240-41 (M. Kellyed. 1984). 
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his disposal, would swiftly resolve disputes among people and send them 
about their business. But now the bureaucratic organization of the Ministry 
of Justice has attained unimaginable proportions, and is, in addition, quite 
incapable of producing results." 
In his political magnum OPWi, written before the Revolution and published under the 
title of Islamic Government, Ayatollah Khomeini severely criticized the European origin 
of Iran's legal system.' He claimed that although some Islamic precepts had been added 
to the country's laws just to "fool the people," the anti-Islamic nature ofthe monarchical 
legal system was due to the overwhelming influence of French and Belgian jurispru-
dence.' A further impetus for Ayatollah Khomeini to call for the replacement of Iran's 
judicial system with an Islamic one came from his conception of justice. As Khomeini 
contended, all secular governments, be they monarchical or republican, communist or 
capitalist, rely on man-made laws to govern their affairs. 
In contrast, an Islamic government would rely on God-given laws, as enumerated 
in the holy Quran, which are infinitely more just than man-made laws even under the 
best of circumstances.5 In other words, justice as the expression of Divine Will should 
become an integral part of an Islamic society. The exercise of Divine Will is performed 
by the Prophet Mohammad and his rightful successors, or Imams as they are called in 
Shi'a branch of Islam, which is the dominant belief system in Iran. It is incumbent upon 
the believers to obey the Prophet and his successors who execute God's Sovereign Will.6 
The two major divisions in Islam, the Sunni and the Shi'a schools, concur on the 
principle that either a member of the Prophet's family or a member of his tribe can 
exercise the Divine Sovereign Will for the Muslim community. The Shi'as contend that 
the Divine Sovereign Will can be exercised in a jWit manner only by a member of the 
Prophet's family. The Sunnis, on the other hand, have argued that "membership in the 
larger circle of the prophet's tribe was quite adequate for the requirements of political 
justice."7 This doctrinal difference between the Sunnis and the Shi'as has led to the 
latter's acceptance of the legitimacy of the principle of Imamate as the sole vehicle for 
establishing ajust socio-political system. That is, the acceptance of Ali, the Prophet's son-
in-law, as the first rightful successor to Mohammad, followed by Ali's male descendants 
in direct line, is for the Shi'as a sine qua non for establishing ajust political order. However, 
according to the Twelver Shi'ism (the dominant sect in Iran), the Twelfth Imam went 
into occultation and will return at sometime in the future in the person of the Mahdi, 
or Messiah, when he will once again establishjustice on earth.s In the absence of the 
Twelfth Imam, the ulema, or religious scholars, would guide the Shi'a community on a 
righteous path. 
As secular rulers gradually enhanced their power vis-a-vis the ulema, the religious 
authorities in the Shi'a communities were pushed to the fringes of the political order. 
As a consequence, the ulema became mere dispensers of opinions on religious exegeses 
and provided guidance for the believers on issues of faith. Ayatollah Khomeini intro-
• H. ALGAR, ISLAM AND REVOLUTION 58-59 (1981). 
• R. KHOMEINI, ISLAMIC GOVERNMENT 12-13 (1971). 
4Id. 
S See id. at 52-55. 
6 M. KHADDURI, THE ISLAMIC CONCEPTION OF JUSTICE 14-20 (1984). 
7Id. at 16. 
8 A. SACHEDINA, ISLAMIC MESSIANISM 78-79 (1981). 
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duced a radical dimension to this long-standing role performed by the Shi'a ulema. 
Khomeini argued against the notion that the duty of the ulema was simply to render 
advice to the believers. Instead, he maintained that when the advice of the ulema is 
disregarded by secular rulers, as was the case in Pahlavi Iran, the ulema are obligated to 
"take over authority and put an end to corruption and injustice."9 In order to accomplish 
this task in monarchical Iran, it was incumbent upon the ulema to establish an Islamic 
government under the guardianship of velayat-e faqih (government of the just jurist) and 
institute the shari'a as the only source of law in the country.1O 
II. SECULARISM AND CONSTITUTIONALISM: A BRIEF OVERVIEW 
The Iranian legal system in the 20th century has been shaped, to a great extent, by 
the larger struggle between secular and religious forces. After the Iranian Constitutional 
Revolution of 1906-1907, the country developed a codified legal system adopted from 
the European legal codes with a heavy French influence. The modifications made to the 
Constitution in 1907, however, recognized the long-standing religious influence in the 
country's legal system by providing for a two-tiered structure in the new legal system. 
That is, a distinction was made between the secular law (urf) and religious, Islamic law 
(shari'a). The Muslim clerics were allowed to maintain exclusive control over family law, 
such as the law of marriage, divorce, succession, and the like. In general, the clergy, 
much to the dismay of the secular constitutionalists, continued to exercise de facto juris-
diction in most areas of civil law. The clergy's power to exercise near monopolistic control 
in civil cases was due primarily to the absence of any effective centralized governmental 
control over the country's nascent legal system. ll 
Efforts at centralization and secularization of Iran's legal structures began in 1910 
with the establishment of the Central Public Prosecutor's Office, and a year later, when 
the Ministry of Justice was reorganized to perform its constitutional mandate of cen-
tralizing the country's legal system. However, the first serious and sustained attempt to 
promulgate secular laws began when Reza Shah, the founder of the Pahlavi dynasty, 
assumed power in 1925. With the help of Ali Akbar Davar, the Swiss-educated Minister 
of Justice, Reza Shah embarked upon an ambitious program of overhauling the tradi-
tional Iranian legal system and codifying the law away from its Islamic roots and towards 
the European legal tradition. Reza Shah not only pushed the passage of a wide-ranging 
array of secular laws, he did so even when they expressly contravened the shari'a, hence 
incurring the wrath of the ulema. 
Attempts at further secularization of the Iranian legal system continued under the 
rule of Reza Shah's son, Mohammad Reza Shah, the last of the Pahlavi monarchs. 
Furthermore, Mohammad Reza Shah sought to professionalize the appointment of 
judges by making it difficult for a cleric to function as a sitting judge in a court of law. 
For example, a law passed on December 27, 1946 required that judges hold a degree 
from the Faculty of Law at Tehran University (or an equivalent foreign university). Since 
the ulema had received their legal training in religious seminaries rather than at the 
9 M. KHADDURI, supra note 6, at 225. See also J. COLE & N. KEDDIE, SHI'ISM AND SOCIAL PROTEST 
1-29 (1960). 
10 See H. ALGAR, supra note 2. at 40-49. 
II See A. SALEH. ON THE HISTORY OF IRANIAN LAW (1964); A. MANSUR. HISTORY OF LAW AND 
GOVERNMENT (1960). 
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secular Tehran University, they were legally prevented from sitting as new judges in a 
court of law. The law also stipulated that the current judges who were not graduates of 
Tehran University Law Faculty or its foreign equivalent must pass an examination in 
both Iranian and international law in order to remain employed as judges by the Ministry 
of Justice. 12 The net effect of the provisions of the 1946 law was the disbarment of the 
overwhelming majority of the ulema and their removal from cherished judicial positions. 
III. SOURCES OF LAw IN THE ISLAMIC REpUBLIC OF IRAN 
With the victory of the Iranian Revolution in 1979 and the eventual monopolization 
of political processes by the Shi'a clerics, the Iranian Constitution of 1906-1907 was 
replaced by a new Constitution in which Shi'ism was declared as the sole source of law 
in the country. Shi'a Islam, in addition to relying on the Quran, takes into account the 
views and instructions of the Imams to formulate and codify its legal system. Twelver 
Shi'ism has been particularly influenced by the opinions of the sixth Imam, Abu Abdullah 
Ja'far bin Mohammad al-Sadeq, and hence its legal school is known as the Ja'fari school 
of jurisprudence. According to the Ja'fari school, sources of the Islamic law are the 
Quran, tradition (hadith), the consensus of the jurists (ijma'), and reason ('aql). IS 
The Quran is the most important source of law for all Muslims. The Quran, which 
was recorded by the Prophet's companions shortly after his death in 632 A.D., is regarded 
by Muslims as the actual revelation of God to the Prophet Mohammad and its legal rules 
are to be followed in absolute terms. However, as Ann Mayer has noted, "the traditional 
view has been that one cannot accurately understand what the Quranic rules mean unless 
one has advanced training in the religious and legal sciences."14 Since the Quran states 
relatively few defined rules (about 600 lines in the Quran deal with specific legal matters), 
three other sources have contributed immensely to the corpus of the Shi'a law. 
The hadith, or tradition, refers to the statements, deeds and sayings of the Prophet 
and the Imams which have been collected and codified by people who were close to 
them and are viewed by the ulema as reliable sources. It is important to note that 
reliability, rather than the doctrinal views of the transmitters, is considered to be the 
most important attribute of the Shi'a hadith. The hadith collections, along with the Quran, 
constitute the most important sources of the Shi'a legal system. 
The third source of Shi'a law is ijma', which refers to the means by which the 
opinions of the Imams can be discovered. Specifically, ijma' refers to the consensus or 
unanimity of the views of Shi'a scholars who lived during the time of the Imams. Since 
several of the prominent Shi'a scholars were close companions of the Imams, the Shi'a 
doctrine places heavy emphasis on the opinions of these early Islamicists. 
The fourth source of Shi'a law is 'aql, or reasoning. By 'aql it is meant "categorical 
judgments drawn from both pure and practical reason."IS In fact, according to the Shi'a 
principle of qa'idat al-mulazama (rule of correlation), it is possible to infer from reasoning 
a coherent body of religious law. 16 It is important to note, however, that both ijma' and 
'aql are considered by some Shi'a legists as secondary sources oflaw. For them, the Quran 
12 See H. AMIN, MIDDLE EAST LEGAL SYSTEMS 61-62 (1985). 
IS See H. TABATABA'I, AN INTRODUCTION TO SHI'I LAW 2-6 (1984). See also J. SCHACHT, AN 
INTRODUCTION TO ISLAMIC LAw (1964); N. COULSON, A HISTORY OF ISLAMIC LAw (1979). 
14 Mayer, supra note I, at 299. 
15 H. TABATABA'I, supra note 13, at 3-4. 
16Id. 
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and hadith remain the indisputable sources of Shi'a law, and indeed they have become 
the pillars of the post-revolutionary Iranian legal system. 
IV. THE POST-REvOLUTIONARY JUDICIAL STRUCTURES 
The Iranian Constitution of 1979 not only terminated more than 2,500 years of 
monarchy in Iran, but it has also uniquely entrusted supreme power in the hands of 
Ayatollah Khomeini in his capacity as velayat-e faqih. Article 5 of the new Constitution 
states that in the absence of the Twelfth Imam, all political and legal power emanates 
from a 'just jurist" whose leadership has been recognized by the majority of the Iranian 
people. 17 
In his capacity as supreme faqih, or jurist, Ayatollah Khomeini issued fatwas (juridical 
declarations) declaring all pre-revolutionary laws null and void. Furthermore, Articles 4 
and 170 of the Constitution have placed a ban on all laws deemed to be "un-Islamic" by 
proper judicial and religious authorities of the country. IS In the absence of qualified 
judges who were trained to interpret Shi'a principles oflaw, the Supreme Judicial Council 
(the country's highest judicial body) instructed the Islamic courts to "refer to the judicial 
views [fatwas] of the Ayatollah whenever they were doubtful or unclear about a law."19 
Moreover, the Council of Guardians, a body of jurists established by the 1979 
Constitution with the power to veto the laws passed by the Parliament, informed the 
Supreme Judicial Council on April 16, 1981 that constitutionally only the Council of 
Guardians has the authority to pass final judgment on the propriety of any new law or 
the validity of any pre-revolutionary legislation. This apparent conflict of authority 
contributed to the confusion in implementing laws and regulations in the early periods 
of the Islamic Republic. The confusion became more acute in the administration of the 
criminal justice system where some degree of anarchy, or extreme diffusion of authority, 
reigned supreme, resulting in vastly different sentences for people convicted of com-
mitting the same type of transgression but living in different parts of Iran. It was not 
until the centralization of functions of the Islamic judges under the Supreme Judicial 
Council and the passage of hudud and qisas laws (to be discussed later) that some degree 
of uniformity was established in the administration of justice in the country. 
V. CRIMINAL LAW IN THE ISLAMIC REpUBLIC 
As was discussed before, the shari'a is considered the supreme law over everybody, 
and the government "cannot change the law to suit the ever-changing socio-economic 
ciimate."20 This is especially true in the area of criminal law, where punishment for 
certain categories of crime is non-negotiable. Also, the supremacy and permanency of 
all Islamic laws connotes an important principle of the Islamic government: legislative 
and judicial organs of the state should not originate any laws. Their purpose is simply to 
codify and apply the shari'a. This implies that in cases of conflict between societal changes 
and the requirements of the Islamic law, the law is not to be interpreted in such a way 
as to meet such societal changes. Rather, it is the society that needs to adapt itself to the 
17 H. HAMID, THE COMPLETE TEXT OF THE IRANIAN CONSTITUTION 23-24 (1983). 
18 [d. at 23, 87-88. 
19 H. AMIN, COMMERCIAL LAW OF IRAN 63 (1986). 
20 [d. at 32. 
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requirements of God's Will as contained in the shari'a.21 As Joseph Schacht has observed, 
the rules of the shari'a become valid "by virtue of their existence and not [necessarily] 
because of their rationality."22 
The concept of criminal law in Islam differs from the Western notion of the law, 
not just because it is religiously derived but because in many instances the subject of law 
is not the person but his family. For example, murder is viewed not as an offense against 
the society but as a crime against the victim's family. The punishment for murder, 
therefore, is designed to not only deter crime but also to "compensate" the family of the 
victim. Hence, retribution and "blood money" have been an integral part of the Islamic 
punishment for murder. This, in effect, is akin to the concept of wergeld practised by 
Western European nations from the 5th century to the advent of feudalism in the 9th 
century. 
Notwithstanding the hafsh methods of punishment in the Islamic criminal justice 
system, the Muslim judicial system was much more benign than the legal systems of 
Europe. For example, under the Islamic criminal law, only mentally sound adults were 
fully responsible for criminal acts they committed, whereas minors and the mentally ill 
were not responsible for many criminal transgressions.23 Furthermore, as I.P. Petrush-
evsky has observed: 
Muslim law does not allow the use of torture (which several European coun-
tries employed as late as the eighteenth century) nor does it countenance 
'the diving decision' whether in the shape of the ordalia, the ordeal by fire 
and water, or of the legal duel between plaintiff and respondent, as practised 
in Western Europe and Russia in the Middle Ages .... Its [Islamic] criminal 
procedure was marked by speed and expedition and was innocent of the 
judicial delay, ... which characterized European and Russian courts in the 
last century.24 
Whereas Islamic criminal law remained unchanged for centuries, reforms and alterations 
in much of Western law have incorporated safeguards and guarantees of protection for 
the accused; they have also adapted the law to reflect societal mores and changing values. 
The Quran deals only with a few categories of crime with specific punishment for 
each. These transgressions include adultery, consumption of alcohol, fornication, theft, 
brigandage, and accusations of unchastity. According to the dominant Shi'a doctrine, as 
well as some Sunni schools of law, apostasy and rebellion against a righteous Islamic 
government also fall into the category of crimes with Quranic punishments, which range 
from flogging to execution. The apparent incongruity of such punishments as public 
floggings, mutilations and stoning to death, with the modern and internationally accepted 
norms of conduct, is lost on the proponents of the literal application of Quranic punish-
ment, as they argue that only such public spectacles will deter the occurrence of future 
crimes.25 
In general, the Islamic Republic's penal code has divided crimes into the four 
categories of hudud, qisas, ta'zir, and diyat based on the type of punishment for each 
category of offense. Hudud crimes are acts prohibited by God and punishable by man-
21 See Y. NOORI, ISLAMIC GOVERNMENT AND REVOLUTION IN IRAN 11-74 (1985). 
22 J. SCHACHT, supra note 13, at 203. 
2'1. PETRUSHEVSKY, ISLAM IN IRAN 135 (H. Evans trans. 1985). 
24 [d. 
25 Mayer, supra note 1, at 242. 
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datory penalties defined by the Quran.26 Although Islamic jurists differ on the precise 
nature of hudud crimes, the Iranian penal code considers the following as hudud offenses: 
theft, robbery, adultery, apostasy, drinking of alcoholic beverages, and rebellion against 
Islam as interpreted and defined by the religious authorities and legists in Iran. 
Since hudud crimes are specific and their penalties are specified in the Quran, the 
judge exercises no discretion as to the type of punishment imposed. The harshness of 
the punishment of hudud crimes, such as the amputation of hands for theft or stoning 
to death for adultery, have cast a negative image on revolutionary Iran's administration 
of justice. However, the Iranian authorities rebut Western criticism of their country's 
system of justice by claiming that lawbreakers should not be seen simply as sick individ-
uals, and their punishment as a form of treatment for their sickness. As the Islamic 
Republic's Chief Justice, Ayatollah Mussavi Ardabili, has contended: "Islam teaches us 
that it is equally important to punish a lawbreaker, as a punishment is considered to 
have three purposes - repentence of the crime, admonition to not repeat it, and a 
lesson to others."27 In the same vein, Ayatollah Khomeini, responding to domestic critics 
of Iran's new penal code, stated: "When a measure of punishment is carried out, it 
teaches the person concerned a lesson and this is beneficial for the nation .... It is a 
sin to be merciful to someone who should be receiving a certain measure of punishment. 
In fact, it would be damaging to the person concerned .... "28 
Of all punishments of hudud crimes, severance of thieves' hands has become the 
most frequent method of punishment under Iran's Islamic penal code. The authorities 
have, in fact, boasted that they have developed a perfect device for the speedy amputation 
of hands, which is carried out primarily by the Judicial Police inside the prisons. Ac-
cording to Abbas Hashemi Ishaqpour, the head of the Judicial Police, several persons 
from the Ministry of Health, Coroner's Office, and Tehran and Beheshti Universities 
Medical Faculty have been consulted to develop a "safe and speedy" method of ampu-
tation of arms and hands.29 
Qisas crimes include murder, manslaughter, battery and mutilation. The Islamic law 
regards such offenses as acts against the victim and his family and allows for "inflicting 
on a culprit an injury exactly equal to the injury he inflicted on his victim."30 The decision 
to inflict retribution on the culprit rests with the victim and the victim's family in case 
of murder. Although retribution in kind and vendettas are allowed under the Qisas 
crimes and punishment, it is important to note that both the Quran and the Iranian 
penal code recommend forgiveness, because the act of forgiving pleases God.31 On 
numerous occasions, Ayatollah Khomeini has chastised the clerical authorities for their 
zealous advocacy in encouraging retribution and vendettas in qisas cases.32 
26 G. HOJATI-ASHRAFI, THE COMPLETE COLLECTION OF THE PENAL CODE AND CRIMINAL REGU-
LATIONS 3M-4M (1986). See also I. PETRUSHEVSKY, supra note 23, at 136-38; Al-Alfi, Punishment in 
Islamic Law, in THE ISLAMIC CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 227-28 (M. Bassiouni ed. 1982); M. EL-AwA, 
PUNISHMENT IN ISLAMIC LAW 23-24 (1982). 
27 Iran Times, August 9, 1985, at 1, col. 1. 
28Id. 
29 Kayhan, November 21, 1984, at 4, col. 2; Iran Times, December 7, 1984, at 4, col. 1. The 
first usage of the "amputation machine" occurred in February 1985 when a thief's hands were 
amputated in Tehran's Qasr prison. See Iran Times, February 15, 1985, at 1, col. 2. 
30 M. EL-AWA, supra note 26, at 69. 
31 See G. HOJATI-ASHRAF!, supra note 26, at 14M-23M; Iran Times, October 1,1982, at 12, col. 
1. 
32 See Iran Times, September 7, 1984, at 5, col. 3. 
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The practice of qisas, more than any other aspect of Islamic criminal law, had its 
origin in pre-Islamic Arabia, where acts of vengeance and blood feuds pitting one 
bedouin tribe against another were accepted practices of conflict resolution. With the 
advent of Islam, the practice of taking vengeance against the whole tribe was reduced 
to acts of retribution against the culprit alone and not his family or tribe. Also, the family 
of the victim was allowed to ask for alternatives, such as blood money, or even forgiveness 
of the slayer, rather than physical acts of vengeance." 
Ta'zir offenses are those for which no specific penalties are mentioned in the Quran 
or hadith. Therefore, the punishment of ta'zir is left to the discretion of the Islamic judge, 
who should take the public interest and changing requirements of the time to mete out 
an appropriate punishment. '4 However, the judge's discretionary power is not boundless. 
In the Islamic penal code, the range of punishment of ta'zir crimes has been determined 
and codified in law, which ranges from admonition, to fines, to seizure of property. Such 
punishments also include public flogging, which has become a common ta'zir punishment 
in the Islamic Republic of Iran for such offenses as "immoral behavior," "immodest 
clothing," public drunkenness, and the like. 
Diyat punishment is not strictly a separate category of punishment under the Islamic 
law. It refers to a form of compensation, or blood money, which is to be paid to the 
victim or his family as reparation for an injury or murder.'5 In other words, diyat becomes 
a form of punishment if a victim or his family (in case of unintentional manslaughter) 
choose to forgo their right of retribution under qisas and instead demand blood money 
from the perpetrator of the crime. The Iranian penal code has extensively codified the 
nature of diyat for various types of crimes and the time element required in payment of 
diyat in each case. 
VI. THE CRIMINAL COURT SYSTEM 
The Constitution of 1979 delegates the administration of justice in Iran to the 
Ministry of Justice. The specific organs within the Ministry of Justice which deal with 
criminal matters are explained below. 
A. Supreme Judicial Council 
This is the highest ranking judicial body in the Islamic Republic. Like many other 
post-revolutionary organizations, the Supreme Judicial Council was established shortly 
after the victory of the Revolution on an ad hoc basis. The Council's status as the country's 
supreme body of judicial authority was later confirmed by Article 157 of the 1979 
Constitution. In addition to having wide latitude in interpretation of the application of 
the shari'a, the Supreme Judicial Council has the ultimate authority over the appointment, 
promotion, suspension, and dismissal of all judges in Iran.'6 Furthermore, all five mem-
bers of the Supreme Judicial Council by law must be mujtahids (learned scholars of the 
Islamic law) whose righteousness has been demonstrated through several years in the 
study of Islamic jurisprudence, and their authority must be confirmed by velayat-e faqih, 
33 I. PETRUSHEVSKY, supra note 23, at 136; M. EL-AwA, supra note 26, at 69-77. 
34 See AL-ALFI, supra note 26, at 227-28. 
35 Official Gazette (Tehran), December 29, 1982, at 12, col. 1. 
36 This power was entrusted to the Supreme Judicial Council by the Law of July 9, 1980. 
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now Ayatollah Khomeini.37 Members of the Supreme Judicial Council serve a five year 
renewable term. Three members of the Council are elected by sitting judges of various 
Islamic courts. The other two Council members are ex-officio members who have been 
appointed to their post by Ayatollah Khomeini. They are the Chief Justice of the 
Supreme Court and the General Prosecutor.38 
B. The Court of Cassation or the Supreme Court 
As the name indicates, the Court of Cassation is the highest court in the country. 
According to Article 161 of the Islamic Republic's Constitution, the Supreme Judicial 
Council determines the laws under which the Court of Cassation will operate. The Court, 
in turn, is responsible for supervising the proper application of laws in lower courts and 
for creating unity in judicial policy of the country.39 The President of the Court must 
be a mujtahid and is appointed to his post for a period of five years by the Leadership 
(i.e. velayat-e faqih). 
C. Public Courts 
These were established after the Revolution to deal with both civil and criminal 
cases. In their criminal domain, the Public Courts are divided into two sub-categories: 
(l) First Class Criminal Courts, and (2) Second Class Criminal Courts. The former 
category's jurisdiction is in major criminal cases where the conviction normally carries a 
death sentence, or long-term imprisonment and heavy fines. 40 The Second Class Criminal 
Courts have jurisdiction over minor crimes, such as vagrancy, beggary, failure to obey 
the rules and regulations of the police, municipal officials, and the like. Since the 
sentences handed down by the Second Class Criminal Courts are light, their decisions 
are final and cannot be appealed to a higher court. The decisions of the First Class 
Criminal Courts, however, can theoretically be appealed to the Court of Cassation if the 
penalty involved is more than two months of imprisonment. In practice, it is extremely 
difficult to go through the appeals process in individual criminal cases, since the Court 
of Cassation does not see itself as an arbiter of decisions handed down by other mujtahids. 
In cases of capital punishment it is the Supreme Judicial Council, not the Court of 
Cassation, that can pass the final judgment on a criminal case.41 Public Criminal Courts 
are headed by a hakim-e shar' (religious judge). These judges are nominated by the 
powerful Qum Theological Seminary and appointed to their posts by the Supreme 
Judicial Council. Furthermore, the Supreme Court of the holy city of Qum, which is a 
recognized judicial authority on its own, monitors the decisions handed down by the 
Public Criminal Courts, especially in cases of capital punishment. 
VII. SPECIAL CRIMINAL COURTS 
A number of ad hoc "courts" emerged on the scene shortly after the revolution to 
mete out immediate punishment to the "offenders of the Islamic mores" and "enemies 
37 Sections 2(2) and 3(4) of the Law of April 30, 1980. 
38 H. HAMID, supra note 17, at 85. 
39Id. 
40 Art. 198, Penal Procedure Court of the Islamic Republic of Iran. 
41 Iran Times, November 22, 1985, at 2, col. 2. 
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of the Islamic Republic." The Komiteh (Committee) Courts and the Revolutionary Courts 
are prime examples of these special courts. 
A. Komiteh Courts 
Shortly after the victory of the Revolution, some residents of each neighborhood in 
major cities set up committees to guard the security of their neighborhood in the wake 
of the virtual collapse of the Shah's police force, and to enforce "fundamentalist moral 
and religious standards upon the residents in their neighborhood."4! These committees 
have performed quasi-independent judicial functions and have interfered with the legally 
instituted judicial organs. 
They have flogged individuals found drinking in the confinements of their 
own private homes; have physically punished youths holding the hand of a 
girlfriend; and have shown no respect for privacy or individual freedom; 
even playing Western music has occasionally resulted in arrest and punish-
ment .... 43 
Although the semi-anarchic nature of the Komiteh Courts has been changed and many 
of them have been amalgamated into the Revolutionary Courts, they occasionally revert 
to their earlier status as self-appointed guardians of Islamic moral codes. 
B. Revolutionary Courts 
Islamic Revolutionary Courts were first established in 1979 in the immediate after-
math of the Iranian Revolution as a temporary means to try to speedily punish hundreds 
of officials of the deposed Pahlavi regime. The authority of the Revolutionary Courts 
was derived from the Islamic Revolutionary Council, the secretive body that governed 
the country in the early months of the Revolution.44 From their limited early jurisdiction, 
the mandate of the Revolutionary Courts has been vastly expanded and now includes 
jurisdiction over the following categories of offenses: (1) all crimes against Iran's security, 
(2) waging war on God and corruption on earth, neither of which has been defined by 
law, and hence are left to the discretion of the judge in a Revolutionary Court, (3) 
narcotics smuggling, (4) attempts on the lives of the country's political and religious 
authorities, (5) plunder of the public treasury, (6) hoarding and profiteering, and (7) 
acts that are designed to consolidate the remnants of the Pahlavi monarchy and/or help 
other opponents of the Islamic Republic.45 
According to Article 4 of the Administrative Regulations Governing the Revolution-
ary Courts and Public Prosecutor's Office, the sweeping judicial power of the Revolu-
tionary Courts are exercised by a three member panel. The panel consists of a religious 
judge (appointed by Khomeini), a civil judge (nominated by the Ministry of Justice and 
approved by the Court's religious judge), and an individual "trusted by the people" (and 
approved by the aforementioned religious judge). In pratice, however, the Revolutionary 
Courts have become dominated by the religious judge, and in political cases, the Revo-
42 H. AMIN, supra note 12, at 136. 
43 [d. at 136-37. 
44 S. BAKHASH, THE REIGN OF THE AYATOLLAHS 59-63 (1984). 
45 Official Gazette (Tehran), May 10, 1983, at 11, col. 1. 
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lutionary Court "may well consist of a one-person tribunal, namely a religious judge."46 
The overwhelming number of executions carried out since 1979 have been the result of 
the decisions of the Revolutionary Courts whose decisions are final with no right of 
appeal. 
C. Special Criminal Courts for the Clergy 
A new set of criminal courts has been set up since mid-1987 for the purpose of 
trying persons accused of "counter-revolutionary and anti-clerical crimes."47 The judicial 
scope of these criminal courts has been ill-defined by law and remains vague. In fact, in 
the opinion of many observers, these special courts were established to oust clerics who 
were not supportive of the Islamic Republic's policies. Irrespective of the motives behind 
their establishment, these courts have pursued a sustained policy of handing down 
decisions against several clergymen in the country. The first execution of a clergyman 
by the order of a criminal clerical court occurred on October 13, 1987 when Ali Shahidi, 
a junior cleric convicted of narcotics violations, consumption of alcohol, and "spreading 
corruption," was stoned to death in Tehran.48 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
The foregoing discussion on the legal system in the Islamic Republic of Iran raises 
a number of disturbing issues. First, an analysis of the pratices and procedures of the 
various criminal courts by independent international human rights organizations, as well 
as reports issued by several judicial and religious authorities in the Islamic Republic, 
have shown the conduct of these courts to be highly arbitrary.49 This can be attributed 
partly to the domestic turbulence of the early phases of the Islamic Republic's existence 
and the concomitant zealotry of individuals who sought vengeance on those suspected 
to be supporters of the ancien regime. It could also be attributed to unqualified legalists 
who misinterpret the Islamic Republic's penal code. 
Second, the application of many types of penalties imposed for criminal offenses, 
such as public flogging and stoning, has come into direct conflict with the accepted 
procedures of public international law and international human rights standards. The 
Islamic Republic's authorities have tended to dismiss summarily the conflict between the 
punishments imposed under Iran's penal code and the generally accepted international 
standards of criminal prosecution and punishment. The Iranian authorities have con-
sistently asserted that divine laws supercede any international man-made standard, and 
that Islamic law is always supreme over "both customary and conventional international 
law."50 Consequently, protestations of and/or inquiries made by such human rights or-
ganizations as Amnesty International or the International Commission of Jurists have 
been disregarded by the Iranian authorities as either irrelevant or as sinister attempts 
by the secular West to undermine the institutions of the Islamic Republic. 51 
46 AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, IRAN: VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS 29 (1987). 
47 Iran Times, July 17, 1987, at 4, col. 3. 
48 Kayhan, October 14, 1987, at 8, col. 2. 
49 AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN (1980). 
50 H. AMIN, supra note 19, at 30. 
51 AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, supra note 46, at 56-69. 
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Finally, the jurisdictional competence of the so-called special criminal courts, such 
as the Komiteh and Revolutionary Courts, and their exercise of de facto extrajudicial 
authority, have cast a dark shadow over the fairness of trials in such courts. The largely 
undefined categories of crimes, such as mofsed-e fit an (corrupt on earth) or moharebeh ba 
Khoda (enmity to God), both of which carry the death penalty, have allowed the judges 
of the special courts to exert an undue amount of arbitrary power over the criminal 
procedures and have removed any semblance of impartiality in criminal trials in the 
Islamic Republic of Iran. 
